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BOOK REVIEWS
DISCRIMINATION,

JOBS,

AND

POLITICS:

THE

STRUGGLE

FOR

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES

by Paul Burstein, University of Chicago
Press, 1985, Price: U. S. Cloth $30.00, Paper $12.95

SINCE THE NEw DEAL,

Reviewed by Anita L. Allen*

Three sets of inquiries frame sociologist Paul Burstein's study of
the struggle for equal employment opportunity in the United States
since the New Deal. The "struggle" about which he writes is the ef
fort to obtain passage of legislation legitimating demands for equal
employment opportunity, providing channels for redress of griev
ances, ending discrimination in the labor market, and increasing the
income and status of those discriminated against.1 The passage of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Acts, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and its 1972 amendments,2 were milestones in that strug
gle. The 1980's have already become an era of reassessment for Title
VII and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission it created.3
*
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I. P. BURSTEIN, DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, AND POLITICS: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL EM
PLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE NEW DEAL at 127 (1985).
2. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1964, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) to 2000(e)-(17) (1981), hereinafter referred to as "Title VII," was amended by
the Equal Employment Act of 1972, Public L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. The Amendments broadened
the enforcement and investigatory powers of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC").
In broad aspect, Title

VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or

national origin by certain private employers, labor organizations and employment agencies engaged
in or related to industries affecting interstate commerce. Proscribed conduct includes discriminatory
hiring, discharge, job classification and referral. Also prohibited are discrimination in the terms,
compensation, conditions, or privileges of employment, and retaliatory discharges of persons seeking

VII.
VII created the EEOC with administrative authority to receive, investigate and resolve

relief under the provisions of Title
Title

complaints. It also authorized private persons whose complaints against private employers are not
resolved by the EEOC to bring an action in federal court. The Attorney General was authorized by
Title

VII to bring actions against employers deemed to have engaged in a pattern or practice of

discrimination.
3.

Title

VII and the EEOC were criticized in 1970's as having had only a limited impact on the

reduction of labor discrimination. See generally, e.g., Hill, The Equal Employment Opportunity Acts

227

[Vol. 6:227

JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE

228

Burstein's attempt to measure and explain the equal employment
gains of recent decades are thus potentially of practical as well as
scholarly import.
Burstein's first set of inquiries concerns the causes and conse
quences of the passage of equal employment legislation. A second set
of inquiries relates to the role of the social sciences in sharpening un
derstanding of legislative processes and democratic politics. A third
and final set of inquiries relates to the responsiveness of the American
democratic government to the preferences and concerns of the public.
Chapter 1 introduces and motivates these three areas of inquiry.
Chapters 2 through 4 set forth Burstein's account of the origin of Ti
tle VII and his pivotal conclusion that public opinion was the deter
minant factor leading to the enactment of Title VII in 1964 and its
strengthening in 1972. Chapter 5 takes on the competing view that
"elitist" factors such as elections, lobbying, Congressional leadership
or presidential pressure were more determinant than public opinion in
bringing about Title VII. Chapters 6 and 7 report good news on the
economic consequences of Title VII in the 1970's and project the
law's long-range impact. Chapter 8 concludes the book with a
sketchy survey of theories concerning the power of public opinion in
the modern democratic state. It is suggested that the struggle for
equal employment legislation is an affirmative lesson about the effi
cacy of public opinion in shaping governmental policy.
WHY CoNGRESS ENACTED TITLE

VII

Burstein commences with the claim that methodological devel
opments in the social sciences make it possible to eschew vague and
imprecise accounts of Congressional action offered by lawyers and
others.4 Earlier accounts, he argues, identify a "long list of factors"
of 1964 and 1972: A Critical Analysis of the Legislative History and Administration of the Law,

2

INDUS. REL. L.J. I ( 1977).
Responding to perceived opposition to government enforcement of equal employment laws, the

U.S. Civil Rights Commission (" C R C") formally recommended in a

1981 Report that the federal

government seek to "vigorously enforce all laws related to nondiscrimination in employment," alleg
ing that "despite civil rights laws prohibiting discrimination, there is ample evidence that employ
ment and promotional opportunities are not available to minorities and women on an equal basis
with white males." U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Report to the President and the Congress,
January

1981 at 14. The C R C report warned that the unemployment rates of minorities and women,
1970 and 1976 and between 1976 and 1979, that women

compared to white males had risen between

and minorities were still excluded from better paying job categories, and that affirmative action
would be required to effectively combat discrimination. !d. at 14-15.
4.

The methodological developments referred to are uses of statistical and economic methods
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whose distinct causal roles and interaction in bringing about passage
of Title VII are not explained. 5
Towards offering a more precise account, Burstein relies on sys
tematic, statistical analysis of diverse data. Appropriately, method
ological arguments accompany each foray beyond standard social
science resources and traditional uses of United States Bureau of the
Census and Department of Labor statistics. Hence, this book in
cludes arguments that bill sponsorship trends are reliable indicators of
Congressional support for equal employment legislation; that public
opinion poll responses are reliable indicators of the thrust of public
opinion on civil rights matters; and that New York Times coverage of
civil rights and anti-civil rights demonstrations is a reliable indicator
of the impact of the civil rights movement on the public.
On the basis of these data, Burstein explains Congressional pas
sage of Title VII as a complex interplay, "the result of the conjunction
of three forces-public opinion on EEO [here, and elsewhere, "equal
employment opportunity"] and civil rights, the civil rights movement,
and the ideas that led to the drafting of the law in the particular form
it took."6 However, he singled out what he described as the slow,
steady growth of public opinion favoring equal employment as the
"fundamental" determinant behind the initial passage and strengthento systematically analyze and gauge the consequences of "congressional action, public opinion, and
other relevant social, political and economic phenomena" over time. See P. BuRSTEIN, at 6 and note
9 (citing examples of the new social science methodology, including E. TUFTE, POLITICAL CONTROL
OF THE ECONOMY (1978)).
5. Writers have ascribed a causal role in the passage of Title VII , or, to the 1964 Civil Rights
Act as a whole to some of nearly a dozen different factors. See, e.g., C. WHAL EN AND B. WHALEN,
THE LONGEST DEBATE ( 1985) (stressing "citizen support"); F. PIVEN AND R. CLOWARD, POOR
PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAI L ( 1977) (stressing the role of dem
onstrations, fear of violence and the civil rights movement). These include public opinion, mass
demonstrations, fear of violence, the civil rights movement and/or pressure applied by its leadership,
lobbying by commercial, religious and labor groups, the election of Democrats, the moral concerns
of individual members of Congress, and the influence of Congressional leaders and the White House.
6. See P. BURSTEIN, at 94. In THE LONGEST DEBATE, supra note 5, Burstein cites not three
but five forces as having converged to spawn "citizen support" said to have resulted in the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. First, black Americans took protests to the streets; second, protests
were conducted in regions of the country other the South; third, publicized violence against blacks
aroused public sympathy; fourth, civil rights leaders made effective use of the media; and fifth, civil
rights leaders successfully cast the pending Civil Rights Act in appealing moral and religious terms.
See id. at 230-34.
Although Whalen and Whalen employ journalistic rather than social scientific methods in THE
LONGEST DEBATE, their conclusion that ''citizen support" was the fundamental cause of passage of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act is strikingly similar to Burstein's. "Citizen support" appears to approxi
mate what Burstein means by "public opinion".
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ing of Title VII. 7
Burstein argued that what Congress finally enacted, having re
jected hundreds of equal employment measures throughout the 1940's
and 1950's,8 was tantamount to long-delayed New Deal legislation.
The New Deal-rooted inspiration behind Title VII was the notion that
Congress should invoke the Commerce Clause to intervene in the pri
vate labor market to end discrimination.9 Of course, the idea that the
commerce powers of the federal government authorize imposing non
discrimination strictures on the private labor sector had its detractors
both in the 1940's and in the 1960's.1 0 Moreover, while the concept
that the federal government could permit implementation of nondis
crimination policies applicable to private labor gained footing in the
New Deal, key substantive provisions of Title VII made it considera
bly more than simply delayed New Deal legislation. Most notably,
the sex discrimination prohibition of Title VII originated in the Sen
ate in 1964-not in the New Deal.11
Burstein convincingly illustrates through analysis of public opin
ion surveys dating back to the late 1930's and 1940's that there was a
gradual shift in public sentiment toward equal employment rights for
blacks and women. However, he falls short of eliminating doubt as to
the "determinant" cause of Congressional action on equal employ
ment legislation. It is evident that by 1964 the public favored equal
employment, at least in the abstract, and that Congressional action to
secure it in 1964 and 1972 was consistent with what the public fa
vored. As Burstein summarizes the evidence:
Congress first passed EEO legislation in 1964 when the proportion of
the public favoring EEO and the public's intensity of concern had

7. See P.BURSTEIN, at 95.
8.

Cf Hill, supra note 3, at 2 note 7.

9.

The Commerce Clause, U.S.

CONST., art. I, § 8, provides that: "The Congress shall have

Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes; .. .. "

10. See, e.g., Ervin, The United States Congress and Civil Rights Legislation, 42 N.C. L. REv. 3,
7 ( 1963) ("Once we begin using the commerce clause to affect matters that have no rational connec
tion with the free flow of goods, then we have fatally dropped the bar to governmental tyranny that
was the purpose of the original framers of the Constitution, who were so careful to construct safe
guards against an all-encompassing federal government.").

11.

The sex discrimination prohibition was added to H.R. 7152 pursuant to an amendment

offered by Representative Howard
VII. See C.

Smith to belittle or stymie passage of what was to become Title

WHALEN AND B. WHALEN, supra note 5, at 115-17. See also P. BURSTEIN, at 95

("Before the adoption ofTit1e 7, there was almost no public demand that women be protected by the
EEO law.").
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reached historical high points, the proportion of the public covered by
state EEO laws had just exceeded half for the first time, the proportion of
the public believing the government was moving too fast on integration
had fallen to a low point, and a majority of whites in all regions favored

EEO.
Congress adopted the 1972 amendments to Title 7 when almost eve
ryone favored EEO for blacks in principle; two thirds of the public ap
proved of women's working outside the home, two-thirds of the public
said they would be more likely to vote for a candidate if he or she favored
improving opportunities for blacks and women, and relatively few people
felt intensely concerned about the issue.12

This is very suggestive but not conclusive evidence that, in the partic
ular form it emerged from its journey through the House of Repre
sentatives and then the Senate, Title VII was a response to popular
opinion. It is still possible that passage of Title VII was precipitated
by dramatic protests and race confrontations in the South.
Interestingly, although he defined his task as providing a more
precise account than others have given of why Congress passed Title
VII when it did and in the form that it did, Burstein did not focus
sharply or realistically on the motives of individual Congressmen. He
did not take evidence of actual motives and what shaped them sys
tematically into account. No methodological rationale was offered for
restricting attention to influences on aggregate action rather than the
motives of individual players. Although the barriers to identification
of motives are apparent, Charles and Barbara Whalen's journalistic
account of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 demonstrates
that carefully organized factual data can shed light on the complex
motives of Presidents and members of Congress.13 Failing to take
such data into account, Burstein's conclusion that public opinion was
the fundamental determinant of Congressional action-though based
on the methods and theories of social science-is, after all, imprecise.
Burstein has not succeeded at precisely and conclusively estab
lishing public opinion as the "determinant" factor behind passage of
Title VII, but he has made good use of his data to clarify the roles of
elections, lobbying, Congressional leadership and the White House.14
One of Burstein's primary concerns was to establish whether these
12.

Id.

at 67.

13. C. WHALEN AND B. WHALEN, supra note 5. These writers present lush, detailed factual
data highly suggestive of the motives of individual Congressmen, but without an overt methodologi
cal rationale for doing so.
14.

See generally P.BURSTEIN,

at Chapter 5.
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"elitist" factors rather than public opinion were the fundamental
causes of Title VII's enactment. His analysis of the evidence argues
that they were not.
The role played by Congressional leaders in the years before pas
sage was as the "organizers of the congressional response to public
opinion rather than as actors powerful in their own right."15 Nor did
Presidents greatly influence Congressional support for equal employ
ment legislation, so far as Burstein could gauge.16 Lobbying appears
to have had little effect, other than to have helped to communicate
trends in public opinion. Lobbying did not get Congress to act in
opposition to the desires of the public.17
Surprisingly, support for equal employment legislation appears
to have correlated little with the numerical strength of the Demo
cratic party in Congress. Prior to 1964, sponsors of equal employ
ment legislation were not more likely to be Democrats than
Republicans.18 They were likely to be junior members of Congress,
particularly sensitive to trends in public opinion because they could
not be confident of retaining their seats.19 Not until the late 1960's, in
time for the move to strengthen Title VII with enforcement provi
sions, had civil rights become a Democratic party cause. 20
TITLE

VII's

CoNSEQUENCES: GooD

NEws

What effects have Title VII's prohibitions21 against discrimina
tion had on the economic status of its intended beneficiaries? Have
the relative employment gains of minorities and women attributable
to equal employment legislation been negligible as some critics claim?
Toward providing answers to these questions Burstein drew on formal
economic models, but interpreted data from a viewpoint intended to
take fully into account the political implications of the passage of leg
islation, the effect of social change on the struggle for equal employ
ment opportunity, and the implication of equal employment
15. See P. BURSTEIN, at 122.
16. See id. at 115 ("Presidents Truman, Johnson, and Nixon publicly favored passing or
strengthening EEO legislation, whereas Roosevelt and Kennedy were neutral and Eisenhower was
opposed . . . . Overall, the correlation between presidential support for EEO and Congressional
sponsorship was [a l ow) .42." [footnote omitted}).
17. See id. at 122.
18. See id. at 100-01.
19. See id. at iOl.
20. See id.
21. See supra note 2.
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opportunity for the economic status of social groups. Burstein con
cluded that, while women and minorities have not achieved parity
with white males, they have made significant economic gains and in
curred no measurable losses.22
This claim is bound to spark controversy. Today, equal employ
ment legislation is being blamed for a panoply of social and economic
ills. As Burstein points out, it is said to have divided Americans by
race and national origin into groups entitled to special privileges, de
stroyed the autonomy of local government, and assaulted basic no
tions of individual worth and merit.23 Moreover, economic studies
making use of the methods and statistical techniques of contemporary
social science have concluded that ( 1) the income gains of non-white
men since World War II must be attributed to gains in productivity
rather than to equal employment opportunity policies and (2) wo
men's income has made only modest gains attributable to equal em
ployment legislation.24
Burstein's study attacked these conclusions and offered strikingly
different ones. He depicted the economic status of women and minor
ities as a function of at least four variables: relative productivity, dis
criminatory attitudes or other measures of the social context, the
demand for labor in the economy and the enforcement of equal em
ployment opportunity legislation. Examining the impact of these
variables Burstein concluded that equal employment opportunity ex
penditures and court victories have had a significant positive effect on
the earnings, income and group shares of women and minorities.25
Burstein concluded that neither women nor non-white men have suf
fered losses attributable to equal employment legislation. Moreover,
22. SeeP. BURSTEIN, at 150-51.
23. See id. at 125. It is ironic that equal employment legislation is blamed, if only on the basis
of impressionistic and anecdotal evidence, for racial divisiveness and impaired self-esteem-some of
the very social ills it was designed to cure.
24. See id. at 125-26.
25. "Group share" in this context is "a measure of the proportion of total income going to each
of the four relevant groups-white men, non-white men, white-women, and non-white women
relative to each group's proportion of the total population, taking into account individuals old enough
to be in the labor force, regardless of whether they were working or had income." !d. at 134. Utiliz
ing the proportionate "group share" measure and focusing on the years 1948-1978, Burstein con
cluded that the economic status of non-white men and non-white women have shown an upward
trend since 1948, and especially since equal employment legislation was passed and went into effect
in the mid-1960's.
White women's median earnings as a percentage of white males registered a distinct decline
during the same period, falling steadily through the early 1970's, reaching their lowest level in 1973
before slightly rising by 1978. See id. at 136-38. However, while white women's relative total in-
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there is no evidence that one group has gained at the expense of an
other.26 Non-white women have been the biggest winners, having
reaped the benefits of new found employment and educational
opportunities. 27
PUBLIC OPINION, DEMOCRACY AND LEGISLATION

Burstein wraps up his study posing a great many methodological
questions and pondering the implications for democratic politics of
his finding that public opinion was the driving force behind passage of
Title VII. Does this finding, he asks, vindicate the pluralist vision of
American democratic government? Is the history of the struggle for
equal employment an object lesson about the extent to which demo
cratic politics can be successfully used to redistribute rights, opportu
nities, and income in society?
Questions like these about the power of the public to direct gov
ernmental activity have been raised before in connection with the
struggle for equal employment.28 However, Burstein may be among
the first to systematically employ empirical data to buttress a tentative
majoritarian optimism. 29 That optimism is warranted, he suggests,
because recent studies30 of the economy, war and civil rights have
shown that the government is frequently responsive to public opinion.
The struggle for equal employment was an occasion when the formal
and informal institutions of democratic government played a significomes as a percentage of white men's declined through the early 1960's, the downward trend re
versed about the time equal employment opportunity legislation was passed. See id.
Burstein concludes that the effect of equal employment on white women has been variable and
less predictable than its effect on non-whites. Women's mixed victory may relate, the author sug
gests, to there being less than universal acceptance of women working outside the home and having
the same rights as men in the labor force. See id. at 150-52.
Burstein's findings conflict with some of those reached by equal employment supporters who
believe Title VII has had little or no impact on improving the economic status of minorities and
women. See, e.g., U.S. Commission on Civil Rights supra note 3.
26. SeeP. BURSTEIN, at 15 1-52.
27. SeeP. BURSTEIN, at 147, 150.
28. See, e.g., Blumrosen, The Crossroads for Equal Employment Opportunity: Incisive Adminis
49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 46, 62 (1973 ) ("The unresolved question
for our time is whether we are able to direct governmental activity, or whether it will, from forces
which we imperfectly understand, drift in such a way as to magnify our social tragedy.").

tration or Indecisive Bureaucracy?,

29. P. BURSTEIN, at 188, 199 ("Democratic politics has not ended discrimination or produced
equality; but has increased the opportunities available to millions of people and helped insure they
would be fairly treated.").
30. !d. at 190.
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cant role in getting the federal government to reallocate econom1c
rights.
Burstein concludes that his finding that public opinion was the
driving force behind passage of equal employment legislation "is quite
compatible with the pluralist view, but not with the elitist view."31 At
the same time he recognizes that "pluralists," represented by Robert
Dahl in Pluralist Democracy in the United States (1967), and "elit
ists," represented by William Gamson, share the core belief that the
government is responsive to public opinion, but that its response is
limited. 32 The differences between "pluralist" and "elitist" lie in the
accounts they give of how much and why governmental response to
public opinion is limited. As Burstein rightly points out, claims that
the process of legislation is "elitist" or "pluralist" are ultimately too
vague to be proven or disproven. But this does not close the door on a
concern for better understanding of the efficacy of public opinion in
the timing and shaping of legislation.
SOME LIMITATIONS

There are more readable accounts of the passage of Title VII
than this one, 33 although Burstein's obvious commitment to the ideal
of equal employment and faith in democratic institutions add a mea
sure of humanistic vitality to a highly quantitative presentation.
There are also accounts that more closely and critically examine spe
cific provisions of Title VII and the activity of the EEOC. 34 Very
little substantive analysis of case law developments, original or other
wise, is contained in this book.
These features will lessen the utility of the book to legal scholars.
On the other hand, Burstein's work makes a unique contribution.
Analyses tracing public and Congressional support for equal employ
ment principles and legislation over a forty-year period are not to be
found elsewhere. His tally of Title VII cases whose decisions favor
women and minorities and his judgments about their influence should
be of interest to labor and civil rights lawyers.
Burstein himself directs readers to some of the major limitations
of his study. 35 One of these is reliance on pre-1980 data, even though
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

!d. at 187-89.
!d. at 189.
See, e.g., C. WHALEN AND B. WHALEN, supra note 5.
See, e.g., Hill, supra note 3.
SeeP. BURSTEIN, at (Preface) x and 11-12.
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consideration of later data would clearly have been appropriate.36
Another limitation Burstein notes is that his study focuses only on
blacks and women. It offers little direct insight into efforts to achieve
equal employment opportunity for Hispanics, Native Americans or
other minority groups.
Burstein is careful to point out that the struggle for equal em
ployment opportunity and the struggle for passage of Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act are not identical. Nevertheless, a further limi
tation of his account is his thin treatment of efforts to obtain equal
employment prior to 1964 through state legislation, the civil rights
movement, President Roosevelt's Executive Order 8802 (which pro
hibited discrimination by the federal government and defense contrac
tors) and the Fair Employment Practices Committee.
A final limitation stems from the attempt to account for the pas
sage of Title VII in isolation from the other titles of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. Burstein argues that although Title VII obtained passage
as part of a larger act dealing with voting rights, public accommoda
tions and education, the struggle for equal employment opportunity
has a history of its own meriting independent study. Indeed, to a
large extent, the struggle for equal employment does have a history of
its own.37 Nevertheless, Title VII was part of a package of civil rights
reforms simultaneously ushered through Congress. It is impossible to
explain with exactitude why Title VII was enacted when it was and
says what it says without substantial consideration of factors such as
the perceived urgency of the civil rights concerns embodied in other
titles of the 1964 Act.
Despite these limitations, Burstein's study possesses considerable
36. Failure to consider more current trends is attributed to delays in publication of his book.
37. Once civil rights deficiencies in labor, housing, education, voting and public accommoda
tions were unified for redress in pending legislation, their histories became, for some purposes, inex
tricable. The partial extricability of their histories is well-illustrated, however, by the 1959 Report of
the US Commission on Civil Rights . The general purpose of the Report was to transmit findings of
an investigation into voting practices, public education, and housing to determine the extent to
which the equal protection guarantees of the 14th Amendment were being abridged in and by the
states. Whatever its members' views on private employment discrimination may have been, the
Commission was not authorized to investigate allegations of labor-related discrimination. This
meant proponents of equal employment were compelled to continue separately pursuing alternative
means of bringing employment discrimination to the attention of Congress and the President. Oppo
sition to federal government intervention in the private labor field appears to have been more viru
lent than opposition to intervention in other civil rights fields. This may explain why the
rudimentary Title VII in the original Civil Rights bill sent to the House of Representatives by Presi
dent Kennedy addressed equal employment but merely permitted the President to establish a com
mission to curb the discriminatory practices of firms having government contracts.
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strengths. Chief among them is an inventive use of empirical data and
politically sensitive analysis of that data to challenge leading theories
and conventional assumptions about the efficacy and future of equal
employment legislation.

